This paper deals with Hume’s
idea of causation and its function in the real world. Section I will give a brief summary of Hume’s
idea of causation. In section II, I will
analyse how this concept of causation functions in the real world, real world meaning
a world that exists independent of the mind.
I will argue that if we accept
causation to be just in the mind, it functions somewhat dualistically; that is,
causation can only seem to function with the aid of this world. However because ‘seems to function’ does not certify that causation functions
consistently, this paper will conclude that there is a semantic and perhaps
epistemological problem with the word ‘seem’
and that faced with the initial question, causation ‘can’ only seem to function.
I
Hume’s idea of causation
comes as an attack to the traditional metaphysician’s account that causation is
necessarily connected. Necessity implies
a certain power behind causal events; that is to say should A cause B then
there is a necessary connection between them.
But Hume is not happy with this idea.
For Hume, there are no a priori knowledge
claims of causation; we simply cannot experience necessity within events. Instead we can only base our claims on
empirical knowledge; that is, experience of the world around us. There is nothing in the world that we cannot imagine
or experience without the aid of the external world, ‘ideas are images of our impressions’. (T 1.I.23).
Our ideas can only be derived from the
world around us, and are copied into our minds.
For how can one know the taste of a pineapple without actually tasting
one? (T 1.I 40) is a powerful argument by Hume – we simply cannot.
So, by rejecting this idea that power; that
is necessary connection, exists behind the objects, all we experience are the
objects unfolding before our senses in what seems to be in constant
conjunction. We observe the succession
of objects, but we cannot observe its power or energy; we simply cannot see fire ‘causing’ wood to
charcoal; all we do see are two separate events, the fire followed by the wood
appearance should they come into contact.
But this connection is not something we come to know with a single
observation. It is only on multiple
observations of fire coming into contact with wood that we learn by ‘custom and
habit’ (E 5) that there be a connection between them. So every time we observe fire and wood, we
make the connection that fire causes wood to burn. The cause then is in the mind:
‘the idea of the one determines the mind to form the
idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of
the other’(T 1.III .14)
It is through objects
regularly displaying a pattern of events that trains us to, the more we are
acquainted with these events, infer a connection between them, and hence a
cause. It is on past instances of
observing patterns of causation that we presume there to be the same connection
the next time we observe similar objects.
Hence, Hume defines cause as a form of regularity[1]:
‘an object, followed by another, and where all the
objects similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second’. (E 9)
II
If causation resides in the
mind, then why does it seem to function in the real world? Hume’s definition of cause is twofold;
firstly it implies the world functions in ways that appear to be regular; for example,
the observation of a rapidly moving car hitting a person standing on the street
will knock them down. Secondly, our mind
forms a connection between these two events taking place, because we assume in
the future that all rapidly moving cars will knock people down. Causation then functions somewhat
dualistically; that is, we form a belief that A causes B by looking at the
regularities around us. In this sense,
without the external world functioning the way it seems, we would not be able
to apply a causal relationship.
But Hume’s idea of causation is problematic
for a number of reasons. Firstly, it
implies that events which appear itself regular are causally linked because ‘it
determines the mind’ to form the idea that they are necessarily connected. However, there are such cases where events
appear to be regular but not causally linked at all. Thomas Reid’s point that day follows night
and night follows day is a classic example; they are both regular in
conjunction of space and time – but neither day causes night or night day
(Reid, 1788). Therefore certain events
in the world can mislead us into believing one to be the cause of the other; in
this case, our idea of causation is dysfunctional when applied to the real
world because they are not causally linked[2]. But Hume’s definition tells us that should we
observe regularity in constant conjunction, then we should apply this missing
connection as something causal.
Secondly, if we learn by ‘custom and habit’
that similar events in the past have produce similar effects, then we can only
infer a certain probability that the same effect will occur in future
instances. Grey clouds in the past are
associated with the fall of rain, but this is not to say that this will always
happen every time we see a grey cloud.
Therefore should causation function in the real world, it does so due to
our propensity to experience something as most likely to happen. Therefore we can only assume to a degree that
just because something has occurred in the past it will inevitably follow in
the future. But our minds are basic
machines compared to nature as a whole, we only assume subconsciously that the
chance in certain things occurring are probabilistic; we innocently take a leap
of faith when we come to judge the real world, and in many everyday type cases
we are correct in our inferences. In a
sense then, causation functions relatively blindly in the real world, for we
can never actually prove with certainty that a similar cause will produce a
similar effect; but paradoxically, it happens to functions with a good deal of
accuracy.
On reflection of these
points, causation seems to function in the real world as a form of scientific
explanation. Regularities that appear in
the real world provide, to a certain extent at least, rules of nature which
only the mind can conceive and interpret as laws. These laws can then be formulated into
equations of some kind in order to explain the cause of something. For example, Newton
It is in this sense then, should causation
reside in the mind, it functions because it attempts to explain how nature
operates; likewise, it frame’s laws that can back up our claims with evidence
from the real world.
But the question is then, do we really
invent these laws, or are we discovering them instead? When we say we are discovering laws, what we
are saying is that we are finding these laws ‘inside’ nature. The rules that
describe events taking place are intrinsically embedded within her, waiting for
our minds to come across them, to discover them. However, should causation only dwell in the
mind, its function must be to that of creating laws based on nature. It is because only the mind can ‘glue’ events
together to a certain degree of accuracy that justifies its function. Causation then seems to work because we infer
these physical laws which are initially interpreted from the phenomenon of
nature that are more or less accurate in explaining why certain events happen.
A key problem impinging on
this issue then is a semantic one: in the initial question what is meant
exactly by the word “seem”? The word,
in context of causation, means that causation seems to function in most cases,
but there are times when it doesn’t; for example, Reid’s argument about the
regularity of day and night. Furthermore
in regard to science and explanation, the laws we apply to nature only ‘seem’ to function in this point in time
until they are refuted or improved upon.
In a sense then we are trapped inside a world of seeming.
In analysing this point it could be argued
that the question: “if causation is just
in the mind why does it seem to function in the real world” is a misguided
or misplaced question since it is precisely because causation “seems” to function in the real world
that Hume maintains it to be in the mind.
References
G, Strawson (1989), The Secret Connexion, Causation, Realism,
and David Hume, Oxford
Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. D.F Norton
and M.J Norton, 2007, New York: Oxford University Press Inc,
Hume, D., An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,
ed. E. Steinberg (1977), 2nd Edition, Canada
[1] However,
some philosophers disagree that Hume advocates a regularity theory such as G. Strawson
(1989)
[2] It
could be argued however that day and night are not entirely separate events;
that is, the connection between them is due to the sun rise, which is only
something we observe as ‘rising’. The
real “cause” is owed to the motion of the earth. It could be interpreted that day is just the
appearance of light given by the sun, and night is due to its absence – day and
night are conditioned by the sun’s light.
Therefore day causing night is not entirely false as these are
controlled by the earth’s rotation and the sun.
[3] A
similar argument is provided by A.
Rosenberg, chapter 2 p.26.
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